ASTRALIS SYS
GNSS physical-layer authentication

Trusted positioning and timing for critical infrastructure.

Angulus checks satellite navigation signals at the radio level, before any system trusts them, and tells operators when position or time can no longer be trusted.

Selected for ESA BIC Padua Position · Navigation · Timing Padova, Italy

The problem

Critical systems trust GNSS without checking it.

A spoofed signal looks real to a receiver. Most systems cannot tell the difference, and keep running on false data with no alarm.

GROUND STATIONS TELECOM NETWORKS DATA CENTRES FINANCE PORTS MARITIME AVIATION AUTONOMOUS FIG. 01 — ONE SIGNAL, EVERY SYSTEM · ILLUSTRATIVE GROUND STATIONS TELECOM DATA CENTRES FINANCE PORTS MARITIME AVIATION AUTONOMOUS FIG. 01 — ONE SIGNAL, EVERY SYSTEM · ILLUSTRATIVE

Our answer

Angulus

A physical-layer authentication and intelligence platform for GNSS position and time. It checks the signal before anything trusts it.

Fig. 02 — How Angulus detects spoofing · Illustrative, no sound

Detect

Spots the physical fingerprints of a fake at the radio level.

Alert

Reports a clear integrity state, not just an alarm.

Stay resilient

Tells operators when to switch to holdover clocks or inertial navigation.

Galileo OSNMA

Physical-layer authentication, complementary to OSNMA.

Galileo OSNMA authenticates the navigation message. Angulus authenticates the signal itself, at the physical layer. The two work together.

Deployment

Software, not another appliance.

Designed to run on standard compute and off-the-shelf radio front ends, next to the GNSS receivers you already operate.

Sectors

Where Angulus matters.

  • Telecom and open RAN

    Risk
    5G and 6G cells synchronise to GNSS-disciplined clocks, so one spoofed feed can corrupt timing across many cells at once.
    Angulus
    Checks the GNSS signal at the radio level, before a cell’s clock trusts it.
    Planned
    Angulus as software on AI-RAN and O-RAN platforms, and existing telecom towers repurposed as a wide network of GNSS monitoring sites.
  • Finance and data centres

    Risk
    Trades, transactions and system logs are timestamped with GNSS time, and financial regulators expect trading clocks to be traceable to UTC.
    Angulus
    Watches the GNSS signal that feeds the timing reference and reports when it can no longer be trusted.
    In development
    A record of when GNSS time could not be trusted, to support DORA, NIS2 and MiFID II clock-synchronisation obligations. And a version you can install from AWS.
    Regulation
    DORA · NIS2 · MiFID II RTS 25
  • MaritimePolaris

    Risk
    Dynamic-positioning vessels for offshore survey and construction hold position by GNSS. A spoofed fix can feed the DP system a false position.
    Polaris
    The maritime package of Angulus. It runs alongside the vessel’s existing GNSS and alerts the bridge when the position fix can no longer be trusted.
    In development
    Alerts designed around bridge alert management (IEC 62923), so they reach the crew the same way other bridge alerts do.
  • Space ground segment

    Risk
    Ground stations and mission control time-tag telemetry, commands and tracking data with GNSS time. A spoofed clock can throw off pass schedules and orbit-determination data, often at remote, unattended sites.
    Angulus
    Watches the GNSS signal at the station antenna and flags when the time it carries can no longer be trusted, so the station can hold on its local clock.
    Planned
    One view across a whole network of ground stations, built with partners.

Contact

Talk to us.

Angulus is in validation, and we are looking for a small number of pilot sites.

For operators

Become a pilot site. Tell us about your timing or positioning setup.

Talk about a pilot
For partners

Validate Angulus with us. Testbeds, simulator scenarios and joint ESA and EU proposals.

Work with us