Trusted positioning and timing for critical infrastructure.
Angulus checks satellite navigation signals at the radio level, before any system trusts them, and tells operators when position or time can no longer be trusted.
The problem
Critical systems trust GNSS without checking it.
A spoofed signal looks real to a receiver. Most systems cannot tell the difference, and keep running on false data with no alarm.
Our answer
Angulus
A physical-layer authentication and intelligence platform for GNSS position and time. It checks the signal before anything trusts it.
Detect
Spots the physical fingerprints of a fake at the radio level.
Alert
Reports a clear integrity state, not just an alarm.
Stay resilient
Tells operators when to switch to holdover clocks or inertial navigation.
Galileo OSNMA
Physical-layer authentication, complementary to OSNMA.
Galileo OSNMA authenticates the navigation message. Angulus authenticates the signal itself, at the physical layer. The two work together.
Deployment
Software, not another appliance.
Designed to run on standard compute and off-the-shelf radio front ends, next to the GNSS receivers you already operate.
Sectors
Where Angulus matters.
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Telecom and open RAN
- Risk
- 5G and 6G cells synchronise to GNSS-disciplined clocks, so one spoofed feed can corrupt timing across many cells at once.
- Angulus
- Checks the GNSS signal at the radio level, before a cell’s clock trusts it.
- Planned
- Angulus as software on AI-RAN and O-RAN platforms, and existing telecom towers repurposed as a wide network of GNSS monitoring sites.
-
Finance and data centres
- Risk
- Trades, transactions and system logs are timestamped with GNSS time, and financial regulators expect trading clocks to be traceable to UTC.
- Angulus
- Watches the GNSS signal that feeds the timing reference and reports when it can no longer be trusted.
- In development
- A record of when GNSS time could not be trusted, to support DORA, NIS2 and MiFID II clock-synchronisation obligations. And a version you can install from AWS.
- Regulation
- DORA · NIS2 · MiFID II RTS 25
-
MaritimePolaris
- Risk
- Dynamic-positioning vessels for offshore survey and construction hold position by GNSS. A spoofed fix can feed the DP system a false position.
- Polaris
- The maritime package of Angulus. It runs alongside the vessel’s existing GNSS and alerts the bridge when the position fix can no longer be trusted.
- In development
- Alerts designed around bridge alert management (IEC 62923), so they reach the crew the same way other bridge alerts do.
-
Space ground segment
- Risk
- Ground stations and mission control time-tag telemetry, commands and tracking data with GNSS time. A spoofed clock can throw off pass schedules and orbit-determination data, often at remote, unattended sites.
- Angulus
- Watches the GNSS signal at the station antenna and flags when the time it carries can no longer be trusted, so the station can hold on its local clock.
- Planned
- One view across a whole network of ground stations, built with partners.
Contact
Talk to us.
Angulus is in validation, and we are looking for a small number of pilot sites.
Become a pilot site. Tell us about your timing or positioning setup.
Talk about a pilotValidate Angulus with us. Testbeds, simulator scenarios and joint ESA and EU proposals.
Work with us